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AAbstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use Actor Network Theory to explore the 
role of management accounting systems (MAS) in the construction of business 
strategy.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on findings from an ethnographic 
study of a UK-based firm. Theoretical concepts from Actor-Network Theory are used 
to illuminate the findings of the study. 
 
Findings – The study found that MAS acted as an obligatory point of passage into the 
strategic agenda of the firm. However, our findings also reveal the political tactics 
used by employees in order to work within, against and around the MAS.  
 
Originality/value – The paper shows that MAS are a key player in the political 
contests that occur during the process of strategy formulation, as opposed to offering a 
neutral tool for measuring the strategic value of innovative ideas.  
 
Keywords - Accounting, Politics, Power, Strategy. 
 
Paper type - Research paper 
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Introduction 
Why do some ideas turn into ‘strategies’ when others do not? If strategy is influenced 
by social, political and institutional forces as opposed to being based on a rational 
assessment of core competencies or market opportunities, we cannot assume that 
certain ideas offer inherently greater added value than others. Instead, the question 
becomes: why do some ideas become regarded as strategic while others do not? In 
this paper, we draw upon the findings of an ethnographic study of a UK firm to 
examine the role of management accounting systems (MAS) in the construction and 
legitimation of strategic ideas. Drawing inspiration from Actor Network Theory 
(ANT), we show how MAS acted as obligatory points of passage in the construction 
of organizational strategy. However, our findings also reveal spaces for resistance, 
deviance and voice within an existing MAS. We argue that accounting regimes play a 
key role in defining the ‘added value’ of ideas, with implications for how business 
strategies are formulated. 
 
Accounting and the Making of Strategy 
The growing field of ‘strategy as practice’ (SAP) has been valuable in de-mystifying 
the concept of ‘strategy’ and revealing the practices that underlie how strategies are 
made and implemented. This field mirrors the so-called ‘turn to practice’ within 
accounting research (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007a). The SAP field has shifted the terms 
of the debate away from what strategy an organization should have towards viewing 
strategy as something people do (Whittington, 1996, 2003, 2004; Johnson, Melin & 
Whittington 2003). However, current work has yet to interrogate how certain ideas 
become transformed into ‘strategies’ while others do not. If we accept that ideas must 
be made into ‘strategic’ ideas, as opposed to having a ‘strategic’ essence to them, we 
need to study how ideas become strategic.  
 
The Politics of Strategy 
Current thinking within SAP has recently been criticised for its lack of attention to 
issues of power and politics (Carter, Clegg & Kornberger, 2008a, 2008b). Given that 
power is central to organizational life (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006), this 
omission leaves the SAP field with a tendency to view strategy as a neutral process of 
deciding on the direction of a business (Carter, Clegg & Kornberger, 2008a: 87). Yet, 
according to Clegg, Carter and Kornberger (2004: 25), “[u]nderstanding of strategy 
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necessitates an engagement with power and politics.” What counts as a ‘strategic’ 
idea or function is thus an outcome of power struggles between organizational groups 
vying to control the agenda.  
Carter and Mueller’s (2002) study of a UK utility company reveals the power 
and politics underlying strategic change. The authors found a tension between the 
‘professional archetype’ favoured by the professional engineers and the ‘managerialist 
archetype’ favoured by the incumbent managers. Both groups sought to undermine 
the position of the other through reference to the strategic objectives of the firm, in 
order to defend and/or extend their power, status and resources. Similar power battles 
and political contests have been observed in studies of strategic change in other 
professional groups, such as Mueller, Harvey and Howorth’s (2003) study of how 
doctors used certain discursive strategies in order to defend their point of view. What 
counts as ‘strategic’ is therefore an outcome of power struggles and political battles, 
not a neutral outcome of rational thought about core competencies, markets and 
environments (Carter & Mueller, 2006). In fact, what ‘being strategic’ or ‘doing 
strategy’ involves has shifted considerably according to the changing fads and 
fashions in strategic thought, from the emphasis on strategic planning in the 1950s 
and 1960s, to the focus on environmental forces following the work of Michael Porter 
in the 1980s, to the more recent emphasis on core competencies and emergent strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1994).  
The debate about what counts as ‘strategy’ can also be linked to broader shifts in 
discourse about corporate strategy that act to reproduce inequality, power and 
privilege across society (Knights & Morgan, 1991: 251). For example, managers may 
account for their work in terms of the discourse of ‘strategy’ (rather than, say 
‘management’) in order to provide them rationalisations for their actions that 
enhances and sustains the exercise of managerial power (Knights & Morgan, 1991). 
Strategy is also the result of (a certain constellation of) power. For example, a power 
struggle may leave certain functions such as finance and marketing being regarded as 
‘strategic’, while other groups such as HR and IT are regarded as merely 
‘operational’. In turn, strategy will give rise to (unequal distribution of) power: a 
strategy of globalisation, for example, will reduce the power of ‘national barons’. 
Accounting can play a key role in these power battles. For example, Dent (1991) 
shows how an  MAS was used to transform the engineering culture of nationalised 
railway organization towards a more commercially oriented culture, resulting in shifts 
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in power centres within the organization away from engineers towards the new 
‘Business Managers’.  
The emergence of certain ‘discursive fields’ allows certain ways of speaking and 
calculating. For example, when the State emerges as a ‘linguistic device’ then new 
ways of articulating and conceptualising the ruling of a population become feasible 
(Miller & Rose, 2008: 57). Equally, strategy discourse also has self-disciplining 
power effects upon subjects (Rose, 1999), designed to transform employees into more 
manageable and efficient entities (Miller & O’Leary, 1987). Alvesson & Willmott 
(1996: 134) argue that “the adoption of strategy-talk has self-disciplining effects as 
employees contrive to gain credibility and influence by demonstrating and promoting 
the relevance of their work for attaining objectives that are deemed to be ‘strategic’”. 
Technologies of managing such as accounting are “sedimented with asymmetrical 
power relations and reproduce structures of differential access to material and 
symbolic goods” (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992: 12). Therefore, it is to the accounting 
literature that we now turn. 
 
How Accounting (Devices) Create(s) Reality 
The discipline and practice of accounting plays a central role in the governance of 
contemporary organizations. In fact, accounting seems to enjoy an almost hegemonic 
status in Western firms (Ezzamel, Lilley and Willmott, 1997). Accounting, it seems, 
has asserted itself as the dominant discourse within the firm. Critical scholarship, 
however, has sparked intense debate about the ethics and efficacy of accounting 
techniques and the political implications of such dominance. The field of critical 
accounting has been valuable in questioning the idea that accounting systems are 
neutral “tools for measuring and allocating economic resources” (Quattrone, 2004: 
647). For example, critical research has moved beyond the idea that management 
accounting systems (MAS) help organizations to make “sensible, considered, and 
goal-directed decisions about the best use of organizational resources” (Baxter & 
Chua, 2006: 43) towards understanding how accounting systems are connected to “the 
local goals of various political coalitions within organizations” (ibid, p. 45). This 
critical research agenda has enabled us to understand the role of accounting in the 
creation of new forms of self-disciplining subjects (Miller & Rose, 1990; Roberts, 
1991: 358-360), where subjects are led to question the added value they bring to the 
firm and see their actions in terms of the performance measurement systems they 
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work within (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007a). In addition, critical research has brought 
attention to the role of accounting within the development of ‘new managerialism’ 
(Hoskin & Macve, 1988), the extension of control over the workforce (Ezzamel, 
Willmott & Worthington, 2004), and even “darker” issues of ethics and exploitation 
following corporate scandals such as Enron (eg. Owen, 2005). 
Our study is located in the more general school of thought that views 
accounting as a social, political and institutional practice (Hopwood & Miller, 1994). 
Following this approach means that we must first try to understand the social and 
political processes through which particular norms (such as standard costing) come 
about. What is accepted as standard practice today, was once not accepted or was 
outsider knowledge. Miller (1998, p.175) shows that “(d)evices that had apparently 
served firms successfully for many years are now seen to be inherently flawed. The 
boundaries of accounting are being redrawn ...”. Such redrawings are the result of 
contestations between different discourses or interests. In this way, accounting can 
contribute to “a more general project of socio-political management” (Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987: 262). 
Second, we must understand the “historical contingency of contemporary 
practices ... We need to think in terms of multiple and dispersed surfaces of 
emergence of disparate and often humble practices ...” (Miller & Napier, 1993: 633). 
By implication, any company’s accounting regime at a particular time is ultimately 
contingent and this means that something else is always possible. The emergence of 
one regime, rather than another, links to the outcomes of power struggles within the 
firm and its institutional context. Third, we should not only focus on 
economics/accounting as a form of representing reality but, simultaneously, as a way 
of making reality: both economics and accounting perform, shape and format the 
economy rather than only observing it (Callon, 1998a: 2). The introduction of devices 
such as profit centres, investment centres, cost centres, is “to change lines of 
responsibility and the possibilities of action by a change in the form of visibility” 
(Miller, 1994: 2).  We must recognise therefore that market regimes or accounting 
regimes are not naturally given, but are made by us. In some cases they are inter-
linked: for example, new calculative instruments linking clinical and financial 
categories helped to create new markets in the field of health care (Miller & O’Leary, 
2007: 731).  
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Actor Network Theory 
ANT, or the ‘sociology of translation’ as it is also known, was first developed in the 
sociology of science as a methodology for understanding how actors (whether human 
or non-human) are enrolled into a network around an idea. ANT looks at how robust 
networks are built through a process of heterogeneous engineering (Law, 1986) that 
make certain ideas – such as scientific theories – become regarded as ‘truth’. A 
heterogeneous engineer in a science laboratory, for example, brings together a 
complex of funding, research articles, scientific equipment, tables, diagrams, charts, 
research assistants and scientific allies to form a successful research programme 
(Latour, 1987). What counts as ‘scientific truth’, then, is based on who is able to 
assemble the most robust network around a particular idea.   
Callon’s (1986) seminal study of scallop fishing showed how a group of 
scientists attempted to become obligatory points of passage – the only path through 
which the actors can further their interests, in this case the successful fishing of deep-
sea scallops. Callon sets out a four stage process through which new social 
relationships were constructed between scientists, fishermen and scallops in St. Brieuc 
Bay, France. The first stage Callon defines as problematization, where network-
builders, in this case the scientists, render themselves indispensable. The research 
report created by the scientists, for instance, sought to become an obligatory point of 
passage by convincing the scallops, their scientific colleagues and the fishermen that 
the proposed research program was the only way to pursue their interests. In the 
second stage, interessment, tactics are used to bring the allies together, to overcome 
resistance and competing problematizations and solidify the network. A range of 
strategies and mechanisms are used, including non-human elements, such as the tow-
lines and collectors used to propagate the scallops and protect them from predators. 
Interessment, if successful, then validates the original problematization and the 
allegiances it involves. The third stage, enrolment, is achieved only when 
interessment has been successfully accomplished. Their fellow scientists must be 
convinced by the experiment, the fishermen must accept and implement the 
conclusions they draw and the scallops must be willing to anchor themselves to the 
collectors. The fourth and final stage described by Callon is one of mobilization. In 
this stage, the durability of the network is only established when the representatives or 
spokespersons are able to mobilize others as allies in the network. Scientific tallies, 
tables, graphs and ballot methods are all involved here. In a successful mobilization 
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actors are displaced and then reassembled in a different time and place, in this case 
into the form of tables and diagrams in a conference room. The actor-network, then, is 
the result of a negotiation regarding the representativeness of the spokesmen, in this 
case the scientific researchers. 
ANT has been described as one of the key approaches in accounting research 
(Lounsbury, 2008: 356; Ahrens and Chapman, 2007a). For example, with reference to 
the strawberry market in the Sologne region of France, Callon (1998a: 20) outlines 
that material investments were needed (purpose-built warehouses) and a ‘space of 
calculability’ was created including the technique of degressive bidding, electronic 
display of transactions, use of data slips and knowledge of the national market. To 
date, ANT has been applied within accounting research to the understanding of how 
accounting systems enable “government at a distance” (Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller 
& Rose, 2008) and “action at a distance” (Robson, 1992; Preston, 2006), the adoption 
(or otherwise) of a new accounting system in Australian hospitals (Chua, 1995), the 
implementation of open book accounting and target cost management in two Danish 
firms (Mouritsen, Hansen & Hansen, 2001), the introduction of activity-based costing 
in a large Australian aluminium manufacturer (Briers & Chua, 2001), attempts to 
introduce standard costing systems in a Malaysian manufacturing firm (Lowe & Koh, 
2007) and the process through which government auditors in Canada construct their 
expertise (Gendron, Cooper & Townley, 2007).  
We follow ANT’s approach to understanding how ‘scientific truth’ depends on 
the construction of a robust network around a scientific theory by exploring how what 
counts as a ‘strategic’ idea depends on the representations of ‘value’ in management 
accounting systems. The power of networks depends on the action of intermediaries, 
or “mediating instruments”, such as “written documents, technical artefacts, human 
beings, or money” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007: 710). The “calculating tools” (ibid) of 
accounting are one such mediating instrument through which markets are created, 
such as the ‘quasi-markets’ within the firm that are simulated by management 
accounting systems, as we examine in this study. However, Ahrens and Chapman 
(2007b: 104) argue that the contribution of ANT is best realised by “studies inspired 
by ANT rather than straightforward applications of it”. Hence we seek to draw on 
some key concepts from ANT, such as the concepts of heterogeneous engineering and 
obligatory points of passage, rather than seek to replicate Callon’s (1986) four stages 
of translation described above.  
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Skærbæk & Tryggestad’s (2009) study of ‘Scandlines’, the ferry division of 
the Danish, government-owned railway company DSB, explores “the role that 
accounting devices can play as people become skilled strategists” (p.1). A stream of 
accounting devices established a boundary (frame), within which certain devices 
operate in specific ways (p.3). Examples of accounting devices include laboratory 
simulations, cash flow scenarios, the IPO, the corporate balance sheet, the 
government budget (p.6). For example, the payback device took certain strategic 
options off the agenda, for instance by preventing investment in ferry operations. 
Accounting, then, is not simply a mechanism for implementing and monitoring 
strategy: it also actively shapes how strategic matters are formulated and decided. As 
Skærbæk and Tryggestad (2009) argue, “accounting devices become strategic in a 
role of (re)formulating strategic ends and rationales, rather than being limited to 
implementation” (p.14). 
The notion of ‘overflowing’ (Callon, 1998b: 254-5) refers to the impossibility 
of totally internalizing externalities: for example, the implicit parts of the contract or 
the unintended consequences of a strategic plan. Attempts to account for all elements 
in a calculation will bring about ‘overflow’ and new externalities and eventualities. 
Strategy produces overflows in terms of emerging concerns and resistances (Skærbæk 
& Tryggestad, 2009: 8). “Accounting is an integral part of framing strategy, that is to 
say the accounting devices become strategic in a role of (re)formulating strategic ends 
and rationales, rather than being limited to implementation.” (ibid, p.14) This also 
means that the notion of a strategic centre needs to be problematized: the strategic 
actor’s identity, for example top management’s, went from ‘company developer’ to 
‘company butcher’ (p.15).  
According to Dent (1990: 21), “[r]esearch at the interface between accounting 
and strategy is, as yet, underdeveloped”. Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann’s (2007) survey 
study found that management accounting systems are closely correlated with the 
strategic decisions made by senior management. However, this statistical data gives 
us little understanding about how accounting is actually implicated in the making of 
strategic ideas. Drawing on concepts from Actor Network Theory, we will show how 
management accounting systems act as an ‘obligatory point of passage’ in deciding 
which ideas succeed (and which fail) in becoming regarded as “strategic”. In so 
doing, we address Dent’s (1990: 21) call for research into the relationship between 
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accounting systems, organizational control and the process of strategic decision-
making.  
  
Methodology 
Case Study. FlexiTeam were a group of ten ‘flexible working’ consultants employed 
by UK telecommunications firm TeleCo. The consultants used the term ‘flexible 
working’ broadly to refer to the use of technology to work flexibly in time and/or 
space. FlexiTeam advised external clients on how to implement home-working, hot-
desking, mobile working, virtual teams and related facilities management, human 
resource management and real estate issues. Their consultancy methodology included 
questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, workshops, geographical mapping 
technology and space utilisation surveys. 
 
Research design. The study was designed following the so-called ‘naturalistic’ 
tradition in accounting research (Baxter & Chua, 2006). Naturalistic researchers are 
“united in their concern for studying management accounting in its ‘everyday’ or 
ordinary context” (ibid: 46). The study took an ethnographic approach and sought to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the working lives of the consultants through non-
participant observation and semi-structured interviewing. Ethnographic research has 
the advantage of enabling the researcher to observe how organizational processes 
emerge over time, and how people make sense of the accounting systems they work 
within (Mouritsen, 1999). Our aim was to try to understand the meanings that were 
constructed in and around the accounting systems, as opposed to researching the 
accuracy or efficacy of the accounting systems themselves. Following ANT’s 
principle of relativism, we remain deliberately sceptical about the truth claims made 
by the participants: for instance, with regard to questions around whether the 
accounting calculations were “right” or “wrong”. Rather, following ANT, our interest 
was in how claims to truth are constructed. 
 
Data collection. The fieldwork was conducted between 1999 and 2003 and involved 
non-participant observation of team meetings, one-to-one performance reviews, 
exhibition and presentation activities, client workshops, sales events, home visits and 
social activities, in addition to gathering documentation and studying audio-
conferences and email exchanges within FlexiTeam (see table in Appendix for full 
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details). The observational data was particularly important in this study because it 
enabled us to examine “the actual calculative practices of actors at work” (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007: 711). As Ahrens and Mollona (2007: 307) argue, “ethnography … can 
be very useful for producing longitudinal observations of organisational everyday life 
through which the functioning of accounting and control can be most fully 
appreciated”. The semi-structured interviews were also adapted to include questions 
based on the ongoing insight derived from the fieldwork observations. In total, the 
study generated four notebooks of field-notes, over a hundred email exchanges, over 
sixty hours of tape-recorded interviews and audio-conference recordings and 
numerous paper and electronic documents, leaflets, brochures and files. 
 
Data analysis. As an inductive and exploratory study, the aim of data analysis was not 
to compare our findings with pre-defined hypotheses. Nor was our aim to simply 
represent “what happened” in the field. Instead of simply reproducing the 
interpretations that were prevalent in the field, our approach was to work at the 
boundary between the emic (the meaning-systems used by those in the field) and etic 
(the meanings used by the researcher to interpret observations), in order to produce a 
new interpretation of ‘what is going on here’ (Barley & Kunda, 2001). Merely 
repeating the stories told by the respondents would be unlikely to add much to theory 
development. The themes and sub-titles used in this article were therefore constructed 
through an iterative movement between the data and our reading of the literature, in 
particular with inspiration from ANT.  
 
Accounting, Politics and the Battle of Ideas 
The consultancy team at the centre of this study were employed by a large UK-based 
telecommunications company called ‘TeleCo’ (all names are pseudonyms). Since 
TeleCo was privatised in the mid-1980s, the company undertook a series of changes 
to modernise its operations. As part of this modernisation programme, internal 
departments were re-structured into quasi-autonomous ‘business units’, treated as 
distinct ‘cost centres’. Business units were held individually accountable for revenue 
and costs, in an attempt to use MAS to simulate market conditions within the firm. 
These changes are typical of the simulated ‘quasi-markets’ associated with post-
bureaucratic transformations (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). A recent example is the 
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creation of pseudo-markets for greenhouse gas emissions to be traded (Malone, 2004; 
MacKenzie, 2007).  
The team of management consultants at the centre of this paper was founded 
by TeleCo employee Eric. Eric was a ‘born and bred’ Londoner with a background in 
corporate property management. His first job in TeleCo was in the Property Division, 
but he had aspirations beyond this role. He saw himself as a visionary thinker that 
would single-handedly try to transform the way TeleCo did business by getting 
TeleCo into the business of “selling solutions” rather than “selling products”. In the 
late 1980s, Eric developed a “big idea” during his MBA dissertation about how to use 
technology to enable employees to work flexibly in time and space. Examples include 
home-working, working “on the road”, hot-desking and virtual teamwork. When he 
then “sold” this idea to the board of directors of TeleCo, it resulted in the largest 
corporate flexible working programme in the UK, at the same time as making huge 
savings for TeleCo from selling off prime-location office buildings. However, the 
focus of this paper is on Eric’s next “big idea”, started in the mid-1990s, to set up a 
management consulting group to sell their “expertise” on how to implement flexible 
working to external clients. The “big idea” here was to find a radically new way to 
sell TeleCo’s telecommunications products. Instead of selling their products on the 
basis of their features (eg. a fast broadband internet connection speed), Eric and his 
consultants would “help” clients to “improve” their business – by implementing 
working from home for example – in order to “create” new customer “needs” for 
TeleCo’s products.  
For TeleCo, Eric’s idea was a radical shift away from their current marketing 
strategy. TeleCo had traditionally followed a strategy of expansion into new 
telecommunications product and service markets, including the newly emerging 
market for internet and mobile telephony, coupled with consolidation of their position 
in existing markets such as domestic telephone lines. The consultants called this 
“consulting-led selling”, in contrast with the current “direct selling approach” where 
sales representatives try to show how their products help to meet their customers’ pre-
existing “needs”. The consultants presented the contrast between the two strategic 
options in a table that was circulated on the group email distribution list (which 
included the researcher): 
 
12 
 
Traditional Selling Consulting-led Selling 
Seller provides product Seller provides profit as the product 
Seller attempts to justify the cost of 
product 
Seller offers a return on the 
customer’s investment 
Seller emphasises product features Seller helps the customer 
(based on information circulated by email) 
 
In short, rather than market products on the basis of features (technology-push), the 
consulting-led selling approach would instead attempt to understand the customer’s 
business in order to recommend technology that adds value to the business (business-
driver pull). In this paper, we analyse how FlexiTeam negotiated the ‘added value’ of 
this ‘consulting-led selling’ model, paying particular attention to the role of 
accounting techniques in this process.  
 
Setting the Scene: The Crisis 
At the time of the study, TeleCo were in the middle of a financial crisis. The company 
had just reported a record level of corporate debt, leading the share price to plummet. 
Team leader Eric broke the news to his team during an audio-conference. All business 
units had been told they had to generate “profit” or risk being disbanded or closed 
down and redeployed to other “profitable” units. Accounting, then, just like 
economics, does not simply observe the ‘outside’, but shapes it (Callon, 1998a). The 
consultants knew exactly what this meant. They monitored their ‘balance sheet’ very 
closely every month because their group bonus depended on hitting targets of client 
income. The problem was that their current performance, according to the MAS, did 
not look good. They were measured on the basis of consulting income against costs, 
as opposed to the sale of TeleCo products or services generated by their consulting 
activities. This meant they were currently regarded as a ‘cost covering’ rather than 
‘profit generating’ unit: these can be seen as different ‘calculative devices’ (Callon, 
1998a). The ‘translations’ offered by the MAS can be depicted as follows: 
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Translation 1 Strategy is about deciding what business the 
organization should be in. 
Translation 2 This relies upon knowing the added value of different 
organizational activities in different markets. 
Translation 3 Management accounting techniques can objectively 
measure the value of different business units. 
Translation 4 Accounting is a faithful ally and obligatory point of 
passage in strategic decision-making. 
 
Being classified as ‘unprofitable’ (according to the MAS translation) shaped the 
expectations, goals and, thus, actions of the consultants. Business development 
manager Nigel explained in our interview: 
 
“We are an expensive luxury. If we worked for any other corporate, we 
wouldn’t be there. Being consultants you are natural fee earners, and we aren’t 
at the moment covering our costs. … Our salaries as a team come to £x, 
including cars and technology. This year we’re going to recover that £x, so 
we’re a cost recovery unit. … In real terms, sales managers have 10 people 
doing £x million each ... We’re 10 people covering our costs. I’m sure 
someone somewhere would rather have 10 people bringing in £x million, 
rather than this intangible thing, which may or may not be adding value.” 
(Consultant Kevin, interview) 
 
As it is clear from this interview, the current MAS made the consultants very anxious. 
They were aware of just how precarious and marginal their position was. The 
consultants worried that their team might be disbanded, downgraded or merged with 
another team. None of these options were attractive to a team that cherished their jobs, 
their status, their reputation and their ‘intellectual property’. Duncan explained in our 
interview how anxious this made him feel: 
 
“The survival of the team, is based on selling consultancy services. … So that 
we have survival, survival in the organization, we’re constantly trying to get 
new clients in. With the turmoil you’ve always got to think about the future. 
Sad to say, but how are you going to last for 2 years? … How are we going to 
survive? … [It] makes me a little bit nervous. I see [other department] 
dissolving and there could be job losses. … [if you] talk to people in other 
parts of the business, like sales, and they say … our target is to get the amount 
of business that is their T&S [travel and subsistence budget] for the year. So 
it’s really small. We’re small in terms of volume, but that’s what we’re trying 
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to change, and I think we’re succeeding. Our volume is going up - we’re 
selling more consultancy services.” 
(Consultant Duncan, interview) 
 
From what Duncan said in his interview, it is clear that the consultants seemed to 
internalize the anxiety generated by the accounting regime. Similar to the study by 
Deetz (1998), the creation of an “internal market” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006: 6) led 
the consultants to see themselves as “in business for themselves” and responsible for 
the creation of profit. However, it also had implications for the legitimacy of the “big 
idea” they were championing – the idea of consulting-led selling. Here we focus on 
the implications of the MAS for the construction of organizational strategy. Nigel 
explained how the accounting regime affected their “appearance” of creating “added 
value” for the company in our interview: 
 
“In terms of ratios we’re covering our overheads, but we’re not generating 
profit. Or the profits and revenues that we generate are identified somewhere 
else it would never be correlated back to us.” 
(Consultant Kevin, interview) 
 
The consultants believed that their consulting activities led to new demands for 
TeleCo’s products (such as broadband connections for home-based workers, for 
instance), but the accounting system did not correlate that revenue back to their 
activities. Their own business unit was only credited with the direct revenue from 
consulting fees charged to clients, not the product sales that they “created” as a result 
of their client work. It is thus the accounting system that ‘creates’ the sale but also 
creates dissatisfaction or resistances as unplanned externalities, or in Callon’s (1998b) 
words, ‘overflowing’.  
While the consultants saw themselves as champions of an innovative new 
marketing strategy they called “consulting-led selling”, the MAS meant their idea 
failed to be seen as a “value-adding activity” because their work was deemed as 
“unprofitable”. Thus, success/failure is not an unmediated outcome of the market but 
a mediated outcome of certain accounting devices. The MAS acted as an obligatory 
point of passage for the consultants to have their idea recognised as a “strategic 
competitive advantage”. The MAS meant the consultants were under threat of seeing 
their idea abandoned, rather than shaping the strategic agenda. However, the 
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consultants also employed a range of political tactics to work with, against and around 
the accounting network, to which we will now turn.  
 
The Word Game 
The first tactic involved playing a game of rhetoric and persuasion. The 
researcher observed the “sales pitch” used to persuade senior management of the 
value of their innovative marketing strategy at numerous occasions. They ‘talked up’ 
the value of consulting-led selling and ‘talked down’ the value of direct selling. In 
their research, Sillince & Mueller (2007) found that talking up and talking down can 
exist contemporaneously: one is used in order to manage getting more resources; the 
other one is used in order to manage accountability and being held responsible. 
When senior management were not present, they performed sarcastic 
impressions of the dominant ‘direct selling’ approach, opening their suit jackets and 
putting on a ‘cockney’ accent to say “wanna buy some kit”, like a street trader trying 
to ‘flog’ stolen watches from inside their jackets. This ritualistic symbolic 
performance brought about powerful imagery of what was, in their view, the crude 
and unsophisticated marketing strategy of the firm, to be contrasted with the 
superiority and sophistication of their ‘consulting-led selling’ approach. Of course, 
this cockney impression was not repeated to senior managers: a more subtle approach 
would be required here. TeleCo were constantly re-structuring their business in 
attempts to modernise and streamline their operations. After one such re-organization, 
the consultants found themselves in a different business section with a new manager 
called Steve. Each re-structuring left the consultants worried about how long they 
might ‘last’. Given their status as an ‘unprofitable’ unit according to the MAS, they 
were acutely aware of how important it was to justify their existence and emphasise 
the value they add to the business: a case of “sink or swim” in their words. During the 
meeting with Steve, the researcher observed an elaborate and impressive performance. 
The consultants told Steve about their “strategic value” and ‘slipped in’ to the 
conversation details of large contracts they had recently secured. The consultants 
spent much of their time emphasising their “wider value” to the business and 
explaining that the way they are measured does not measure them properly. Barry 
explained: 
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“We don’t wanna be selling boxes and wires ‘cause then the relationship [with 
the client] is not there – we would just be a wholesale supplier. Like with 
[Client A], … they only decided to buy the kit after I’d done a vision 
workshop with them. But how do you put that down tangibly that they only 
bought it ‘cause we gave them the vision? How do you measure that? That’s 
the problem, we are not credited for all the work we do to make things 
happen.”  
(Consultant Barry, fieldnotes) 
 
Steve nodded and appeared to agree and empathise. However, the consultants were 
not convinced they had done a good job of persuading their boss that the accounting 
system was an “unfaithful” ally that failed to measure the “true value” of their 
innovative consulting-led selling approach. Steve informed them of a new more 
ambitious target for consulting revenue, passed down from his boss at the last senior 
management meeting. After Steve had left the room, consultants Darren, Georgina 
and Barry voiced their concern about their new boss:  
 
Darren:  “He didn’t seem to have a clue about what we actually do. He 
didn’t seem to understand what consultancy is all about, it’s not 
just about the fees it’s about the kit that wouldn’t get sold if it 
wasn’t for us.” 
Georgina:  “Yeah, I was a bit worried, all he seemed to care about was the 
fees.” 
Barry:  “If he can’t see past selling boxes and wires then we are all 
screwed!” 
 
Kevin then joked that he should “cut his wrists now”, signalling his pessimism about 
their future in the company – and by definition the future of their consulting-led 
selling idea. Although the consultants were convinced of the strategic value of their 
idea, the MAS seemed to be the only point of passage into the strategic agenda 
decided by senior management. As long as senior management saw their unit as 
“unprofitable”, consulting-led selling was unlikely to get onto the strategic agenda of 
the company. As an obligatory point of passage into what counted as “strategic”, 
numbers seemed to speak louder than words. The consultants attempted to “open the 
black box” of the accounting system by using persuasion, but ultimately failed to 
problematize the translation of their “strategic value” into accounting numbers. Put 
simply, without the right ‘numbers’ it is unlikely that an idea will turn into a strategy. 
 
The Numbers Game 
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Given the power of numbers, FlexiTeam found many, some quite creative, methods to 
improve their ‘balance sheet’ or demonstrate their ‘value’. One example was the tactic 
they used to increase their consulting income by increasing the referrals they got from 
account managers. Many potential clients – and therefore potential fees that would 
improve their ‘balance sheet’ – were being missed because account managers did not 
pass on hints and tips to the consultants. FlexiTeam’s creative solution involved a 
non-human actor, the database used by account managers. The researcher observed a 
lengthy political battle to get “flexible working” added to the database so that account 
managers would receive commission on any consulting work that resulted from their 
referral. This tactic neatly demonstrates two key concepts from ANT: first, 
heterogeneous engineering (enrolling human and material actors into a network) 
(Law, 1986) and second, the alignment of interests (convincing actors it is in their 
interests, “I want what you want”) (Preston, 2006: 562). By bringing the database into 
their network and offering incentives to account managers, the consultants were able 
to improve the appearance of their “strategic value”. 
The consultants knew that corporate conferences and exhibitions were a key 
source of new client business, but these events were not ‘billable’ to any particular 
client and did not improve their income/cost ratio. As a result, team leader Eric 
decided to change his approach to sending his consultants to events organized by 
other TeleCo departments. The researcher was copied in on this email from Eric to 
Beverley, a colleague from another department, who had requested assistance with an 
event: 
 
Beverley, 
 
Next year I am being targeted on making a profit for 
[the department] from consultancy. This is one of the 
ways that we can justify our existence to the 
Directorate. This means I have to be very restrictive 
about these types of events.  
 
So I am happy to field somebody for all or any of them, 
but we would need to send you an internal charge fee of 
£x per session just to cover our costs. 
 
Eric 
 
Eric was explicit here in his instrumental attitude to ‘working around’ the accounting 
system. As de Certeau (1998: 37) observed, “a tactic is an art of the weak ... Power is 
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bound by its very visibility.” He knew how to ‘play the game’ to create new internal 
sources of income, if this was how they were to ‘justify their existence’. Ironically, 
this simply displaced the ‘cost’ of the consultants’ time to another department. Yet it 
did mean that their ‘profitability’ as a business unit would appear to improve, and 
with it the apparent “strategic value” of their consulting activities. Given the power of 
numbers in defining the value of business activities, the consultants chose to tactically 
associate rather than dissociate (Munro, 1999) with the accounting regime. 
 
Voice and Resistance 
Whilst the MAS did achieve “individual instrumentality” (Roberts, 1991: 361) in the 
sense that the consultants were keen to maximise their performance-related pay and 
enhance their future career prospects, it did not achieve the sort of conformity and 
disciplinary effects found in earlier Foucauldian studies (see Roberts, 1991: 358-360). 
The consultants did not passively accept the disciplinary technology of the MAS. 
Business development manager Nigel was particularly vocal about his ideas for 
challenging and changing the accounting regime. He regularly complained about the 
‘distorted’ picture that the accounting system generated about the ‘value’ they added 
to the firm. Nigel wanted the team to be measured according to the TeleCo products 
and services they sold as a result of the consulting work with clients, not their income 
from fees. One “creative” idea he had was to offer clients a discount on consulting 
services if they subsequently purchased a particular volume of technology. This 
would radically change the way they pursued consulting business. It would mean 
directly supporting the sale of technology, not trying to compete in an already 
crowded management consulting market. Another idea he had was to offer ‘free’ 
advice and support to existing sales bids. As he explained in our interview: 
 
“The [government funded client work] is a case in point. [Those clients are] 
not going to spend much on technology. They may not buy any. So where is 
the value added? … I think we should be out there supporting the major bids, 
offering our services, making things happen. When we know there’s a major 
bid on the go, lets get inside within TeleCo, can we add value to this 
opportunity for you? … [My colleagues are] going outside of the flexible 
working bit. They’re getting into the corporate culture and 10 people can’t do 
a culture change program. You need a massive capability. … There are 
hundreds of people out there who are capable of doing cultural changes. … If 
they’re diversifying to that degree I see even less reason to charge the client. 
Let’s add value to the selling relationship.” 
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 Nigel also questioned whether the consulting packages they offer actually did 
facilitate technology sales – and by definition the “strategic value” of their idea. He 
points to clients who had bought consultancy and not bought technology, and clients 
who have bought considerable volumes of technology after several free presentations, 
without ever purchasing their consulting packages. 
 
“There’s not a single government client who hasn’t had the input from us, but 
they’ve not all bought consultancy. … They just had the benefit of 3 or 4 
presentations at various stages. On the other hand we’ve had clients where 
we’ve done the 25-30K of consultancy and that’s been the end of it. We take 
them to full feasibility then they stop. They’ve not done implementation. 
They’ve not bought any technology. Where’s the value? If we did something a 
bit creative, [for example] if you buy half a million technology at the end it 
will be discounted by the amount you spent on consultancy. That adds value. 
You can measure that. But who am I to say.” 
 
Nigel seemed to be careful to stress that his motive was generating value for his 
employers TeleCo, not simply maximising his bonus payments or avoiding 
redundancy. He presented himself as genuinely frustrated that the MAS was hindering 
his ability to generate profit and help clients.  
Nigel was not alone in his views. Darren also told the researcher, during a lunch 
break at an event, that he thought the way they were measured, and the behaviour that 
encouraged, was flawed. He explained how the system paradoxically made generating 
consulting fee income difficult. This was somewhat self-defeating for an accounting 
system that was designed to encourage ‘intra-preneurship’ (du Gay, 1996). FlexiTeam 
seemed to find it hard to convince clients to purchase consultancy from a company 
they were buying products and services from. Darren used the analogy of a customer 
refusing to pay extra for the instruction manual that comes with their television. Kevin 
put forward a similar argument in a team meeting. He questioned the value of their 
consulting offering for clients and their employing firm when he stated:  
 
“I have difficulty believing that clients can be convinced to spend 50K just 
deciding what it is they want.” 
 
These responses to the accounting system cannot be categorised as ‘resistance’ as 
such. The consultants did not resist the imperative to be ‘intra-preneurs’ (du Gay, 
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1996) seeking innovative new ways to generate profit. In fact, many felt the 
accounting system discouraged or distracted from this, looking instead for better ideas 
on how to generate competitive advantage. It was in fact their apparent commitment to 
being ‘profitable’ and ‘adding value’ that stimulated these criticisms. They saw the 
accounting regime as distracting, distorting and disturbing their ability to generate 
‘added value’. Their response was that it encouraged precisely the wrong 
‘unproductive’ sort of behaviour. They wanted to resist, but remain within the ‘game’ 
(Bourdieu, 1993: 74).  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we have drawn on a range of theorists in order to understand how 
management accounting systems act as a ‘macro actor’ (Helgesson and Kjellberg, 
2005), in deciding which ideas succeed and which fail in becoming regarded as 
“strategic”. Specifically, we have analysed the political tactics employed by a group 
of employees to build a case for the ‘strategic value’ of their idea. Our findings show 
how management accounting systems (MAS) are implicated in the construction of 
‘added value’ and, in turn, the construction of ‘strategic’ ideas. We argue that MAS 
are not a neutral, technical method for controlling organizational resources, but rather 
a power-laden network of human and non-human actors (such as accountants, 
technical standards, computer systems, paperwork, regulatory bodies etc) that 
construct what is seen as ‘value adding’ activities. Whilst existing research has 
applied ANT to the study of accounting, our study provides several new contributions 
to existing debates. 
Munro (1999: 429) argued that within “technologies of managing, particularly 
accounting numbers, … ‘centres of discretion’ are created simultaneously alongside 
‘centres of calculation’”. Munro (1999) focuses on practices of dissociation to 
emphasise the discretion present in actor-networks. Our study supports Munro’s 
argument that actors are not “intermediaries without discretion” (p. 433). We have 
revealed numerous practices of dissociation, such as where the participants attempted 
to publicise the “unfaithful” nature of the accounting regime. However, our study 
goes further by revealing practices of tactical association, such as where they 
practiced resistance by working in and through the accounting system (for example by 
“fiddling” the numbers). Our study paints a rich picture of the various ways in which 
“accounting information can be used, appealed to and even ignored” (Power, 1997: 
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94). The tactical association we observed was designed as a “move” within a political 
“game” to enhance the power of the protagonists’ “idea”, acting simultaneously 
through and in resistance to the “centre of calculation” (Munro, 1999: 432) of the 
accounting regime. This supports de Certeau’s argument that places emphasis on 
tactics, which are used by outsiders, vis-a-vis strategies, which are used by those in 
power. The consultants in our study, it seems, perceived a contradiction within the 
dominant system that they sought (albeit unsuccessfully) to exploit. As Ahrens and 
Chapman (2007a: 7) argue, research must be careful not to privilege the perspective 
of management a priori. Following this, our study deliberately follows those at the 
periphery of the strategy-making agenda. 
A performative perspective on accounting (Callon, 1998a) requires us to 
understand how organizational control systems measure and reward certain types of 
contributions (Power, 1997: 79-90). As a result, “organisational objectives are … 
influenced by the knowledge of potential accountings” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007a: 
2), as senior management use accounting calculations to “evaluate and intervene” 
(ibid: 3) in organizational activity. Functionalist literature presents MAS as 
techniques for measuring performance, motivating behaviour and rewarding value-
creating activity (Young, Van der Stede and Gong, 2006). However, in our study the 
accounting system was seen by the participants as an unfaithful and unfair system for 
measuring the contribution made by their unit. The consultants questioned the role of 
the MAS as “neutral arbiter of organizational truth” (Roberts, 1991: 355). Our 
findings resonate with Mouritsen’s (1999) study, which uncovered two competing 
constructions by the CEO and the production manager of what ‘flexibility’ meant: the 
former used accounting numbers to argue for outsourcing as the solution, whereas the 
latter saw the numbers differently and preferred investment in new technology. Thus, 
accounting systems act to shape the strategic agenda by crafting “particular accounts 
of what was profitable and what costly” (Ahrens and Mollona, 2007: 328). To our 
protagonists, the MAS was viewed as an unfaithful mis-representation, to others it 
was a faithful representation of value-adding activity. MAS are, therefore, 
interpretively flexible in the sense that they do not speak a single “truth” but are 
interpreted in different ways by different actors.  
The findings of this study are relevant in particular to the study of Knowledge 
Intensive Firms, which are characterized by an intangible knowledge product that is 
both ambiguous and based largely on rhetoric/reputation (Alvesson, 1993). MAS are 
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designed to help to render complex, ambiguous and opaque work activities visible, so 
they can be quantified, monitored and controlled: turning the invisible into the visible 
and the qualitative into the quantitative (Power, 1997, Strathern, 2000). In the case of 
KIFs specifically, with their ambiguity and intangibility, “management accounting 
may become embedded in situations in which there is little clarity about causation 
(the connection between actions taken and goals desired to be achieved)” (Baxter & 
Chua, 2006: 44). Power struggles take place around the question of how to generate 
the “numbers” that speak the “truth” about the value of various corporate activities. 
While the consultants in our study were never disbanded or re-deployed during the 
study itself, they knew this was always potentially “on the cards” because the 
“numbers” were not “on their side”. Not having the “right numbers” left them 
marginal in the strategy-making game. Our findings show the politically-laden battles 
over how to generate the “right numbers”, as “management accounting becomes 
connected to processes through which various battles over scarce resources are fought 
and won, and individuals’ reputations are preserved or tarnished” (ibid: 45). As such, 
we have addressed Carter, Clegg and Kornberger’s (2008a) call for a better 
understanding of the role of power and politics in the strategy-making process. We 
offer a richer notion of ‘practice’ than existing research in the SAP field by 
incorporating an understanding of the micro-political tactics and power plays involved 
in the strategy-making process, drawing attention in particular to the role of 
accounting devices in this process. 
Accounting numbers are powerful precisely because “the knowledge that 
accounting produces is presented as somehow independent of the interests of those 
who produce and use it” (Roberts, 1991: 359). Strategy is presented as flowing from 
the disinterested application of tools and technologies to a reality that exists ‘out 
there’. In our study, accounting systems were seen by senior management as a 
“faithful ally” in the game of strategy formulation, making accounting calculations a 
key player in the battleground of organizational politics and a key “resource in the 
enactment of particular power relations” (Roberts, 1991: 355). According to Power 
(1997: 94), accounting systems “do not simply describe a pre-existing economic 
domain but, to varying degrees, serve to constitute a realm of facts, to make a world 
of action visible and hence controllable in economic terms.” Our findings support 
Roberts’ (1991: 359) argument that the “power of accounting information in 
organizations arises from the way it has been institutionalized as the most important, 
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authoritative and telling means whereby activity is made visible”. Whilst activity is 
(supposedly) rendered visible, the underlying interests are made invisible. As Callon 
(1998b: 252-3) would say, any framing activity is always incomplete: however much 
effort has gone into fitting out the ‘stage’, for it to be at all effective, there must be a 
substantial unspecified network of relationships that is off-stage and invisible. In our 
case, however, the political tactics of a marginal, entrepreneurial group made a 
normally invisible MAS become (temporarily) visible and open to question.  
In our case, the measuring (framing) device ‘consulting-income-from-fees’ 
that made the consultants a ‘cost covering unit’ had its attendant overflow: namely 
consultants’ (increasing) anxiety, worry and unhappiness with this arrangement. We 
agree with others that accounting devices do not simply reflect an environment that 
exists independently out there. “The strategy and the environment do not exist 
independently of the devices, nor do the devices assume a subordinate role in 
implementing strategy” (Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2009: 3). The measuring device led 
to dissatisfaction and brought about intrapreneurial efforts to change the existing 
accounting regime.  
Our study has revealed the political practices that take place on the 
(battle)ground before an idea enters the boardroom. Our study thereby shows how 
‘strategists’ (or, more correctly, those seeking to be recognised as strategic players) 
“express their values, sentiments, and identities and pursue their various personal 
projects through the work they do” (Watson, 2003: 1307). These political activities 
are, we suggest, the very substance of strategy practice. Skærbæk & Tryggestad 
(2009) suggest the notion of an ‘emerging concerned group’ which is not completely 
independent of a strategic frame but linked to it through its use, or non-use, of certain 
accounting devices: “If successful, the problematization conducted by emerging 
concerned groups can participate in reframing the strategic frame, so that these 
emerging concerns are taken into account.” (p.4) In contrast, our ‘strategists in the 
wild’ failed to get their consulting-led selling idea onto the strategic agenda of the 
firm because their innovation failed to pass through the ‘obligatory passage point’ 
(Callon, 1986) of the accounting regime. Numbers proved more powerful than words 
in defining the strategic agenda of the firm.  
We have drawn on ANT because it has been acknowledged as a promising 
theoretical approach for accounting research (Baxter & Chua, 2006; Gendron, Cooper 
& Townley, 2007; Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008). As Miller & 
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O’Leary, (2007: 710) argue, “the network is defined by the emergence and evolution 
of the actors and the multiple configurations they enter into”. These configurations are 
dynamic and always-evolving as networks with a convincing discourse manage to 
become established and powerful, whilst other discourses become implausible and 
disappear (Mueller & Carter, 2007). This dynamic process may not be apparent from 
the seemingly unified strategic vision “at the top”, but was certainly present in our 
“ground level” study of the political battles of ideas. The tactics (referrals; corporate 
events) and language games employed by those on the periphery were not convincing 
enough to establish their own obligatory point of passage. A question that arises in 
this context is whether we have prospects to be able to distinguish tactics that are 
likely to be successful versus unsuccessful ones.  
Finally, our study raises important questions about the operation of power in 
and through accounting systems. On the surface, the accounting regime in our study 
appeared to function as a taken-for-granted institution that dictated the strategic 
agenda of the firm. Yet, as our study has shown, the participants of our study also 
carved out spaces for resistance, voice and subversion within the accounting regime. 
Thus, our study adds to the growing body of literature that reveals how apparently 
powerful actor-networks also contain spaces for resistance, such as people who are 
allergic to onions but faced with standardised food in a fast-food restaurant, to quote 
Star’s (1991) classic essay. As Ahrens and Mollona (2007: 308) argue, with specific 
reference to accounting systems, “actors are left with choices that are conditioned but 
not determined by the disciplining effects of programmes and technologies”. 
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Appendix – Table of fieldwork data collection 
 
Fieldwork Event Number Approx length 
per event 
(hours) 
Approx total 
hours 
Method of data 
recording 
Meetings to 
negotiate access 
5 2 10 Field-notes 
Team meetings 
(monthly) 
5 7 35 Field-notes and 
tape-recordings 
Client visits 2 3 6 Field-notes 
Consultancy 
Workshops 
1 6 6 Field-notes 
Performance 
reviews1 
4 1 4 Field-notes 
Social events 
(lunches, drinks 
after work etc) 
Various Various Various Field-notes 
Work 
shadowing/internal 
meetings 
3 4 12 Field-notes 
Home visits 1 5 5 Field-notes 
Interviews2 9 2 18 Tape-recordings 
Audio-conferences 
(weekly) 
16 2 32 Tape-
recordings3 
Emails >100 N/A N/A Email text 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The request for observing the performance review of one employee was refused for reasons that the 
review was “particularly sensitive”. 
2 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all but one of the ten consultants involved in the 
study. One respondent was asked several times for an interview and replied that he was “too busy”. The 
researcher did not pursue the interview after three requests for fear of being seen as too ‘pushy’ and 
damaging the research relationship.  
3 Due to the quantity of tape-recorded audio-conference data the tapes were not transcribed in full 
(funds were not available at the time for a transcription service). The researcher made notes of the key 
themes of the conversations along with markers of the location on the tape to enable full transcription 
to be made if necessary.   
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